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Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 November
2003 (PSI re-use Directive) has not achieved a minimum harmonisation of national
legislations in this area given the lack of strict standard policy. All things consid-
ered, it imposes few demands on the side of Member States (MS). Nevertheless, it
has been pointed out the convenience of imposing the creation of new institutions
—independent authorities— at the national level in order to supply the lack of clear
legal provisions, control contraventions of the legal framework regarding access/re-
use and provide with rapid and inexpensive mechanisms of resolution of disputes.
This option may seem paradoxical in a certain way since it intends an institutional
harmonization solution before achieving legal harmonization. Legislation on PSI
re-use is somewhat unsatisfactory, so we could consider that the problem we face is
not the lack of institutional support, but the inadequacy and vagueness of the legal
standard to apply in many cases. This paper suggests that, in favour of legal cer-
tainty, transparency and better functioning of the market, the PSI re-use Directive
should force MS to specify which types/categories of PSI are reusable and which
ones are not, so that legal operators may know what to expect. To address some crit-
icisms of the current situation and solve problems mentioned, the PSI re-use Direc-
tive may impose on MS the requirement that a) national regulations concrete the
organ/body responsible in each case to resolve requests on PSI re-use and b) estab-
lish easier and faster administrative procedures and proceedings before the Courts.
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1. THE REFORM OF DIRECTIVE 2003/98/EC AND THE 
PROPOSAL FOR CREATION OF INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 No-
vember 2003 (hereinafter, PSI re-use Directive), intends to facilitate the re-
use of PSI in the EU framework. For this purpose it has tried to harmonise
the basic conditions in which PSI re-use would take place and to remove
key obstacles that may exist in the domestic market (such as discriminatory
practices, monopolies or lack of transparency among others); always within
the limited possibilities that the distribution of powers between EU and MS
allows in this particular case.
In the current wording it provided for a future review of the implemen-
tation of the PSI re-use Directive in order to proceed to the possible modifi-
cation of the regulatory text in case the amendment were needed.
However, before making a deeper analysis,  two considerations should
be pointed out:
1st) The Directive does not adequately promote harmonised regulation
for the re-use of PSI: the contents of the PSI re-use Directive could be de-
scribed as light, very limited or scarce. The Directive hardly achieves a min-
imum harmonisation of national legislations in this area given the lack of
strict standard policy. All things considered, the text imposes few demands
on the Member States (MS).
2nd) To a large extent, this happens in the understanding that the pre-
sumption of re-use is access to PSI1 and on this point the competence of the
EU is more than limited: access to PSI is a national competence reserved to
MS.
Although the re-use of PSI is increasing, its enormous potential seems
still unexplored. The implementation of the Directive by MS, to date, has
failed to totally eliminate some of the main practical problems (e.g. inade-
quate regulations, inaccurate content, lack of information on available PSI,
difficult accessibility by appropriate means; little or no provision at all for
public authorities to allow commercial re-use of information in its posses-
1 On the relation between access and re-use: Cerrillo i Martínez, A. 2006, ´La información del
sector público: del acceso a la reutilización´ in La reutilización de la información del sector
público, coord. A. Cerrillo i Martínez y A. Galán Galán, Comares, Granada, pp. 1-24.
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sion; continuity of exclusive agreements with insufficient transparency; ex-
cessive complexity of the procedures in order to obtain permission to carry
out the re-use; burdensome review systems).
That is why it should be considered amending the Directive in order to
introduce stricter provisions that achieve higher levels of efficiency in the
re-use of PSI. Nevertheless, instead of doing so, it has been pointed out the
convenience  of imposing  the creation of  new institutions  at  the national
level in order to supply the lack of clear legal provisions and therefore im-
pulse/facilitate PSI re-use. This option may seem paradoxical  in a certain
way, for implicitly intends institutional harmonization before achieving legal
harmonization.
Related  to  the  institutional  backing,  it  has  been  suggested  to  set  up
mandatory and independent authorities mainly in order to control contra-
ventions of the legal framework regarding access and re-use, as well as to
provide with rapid and inexpensive mechanisms of resolution of disputes.
2. EU COMPETENCE ON PSI RE-USE: ANALYSING THE ISSUE 
FROM A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE
Distribution of powers between MS and EU is a key aspect of institutional
backing.2 It  should  be  noted  that  the  categories  "exclusive  competence",
"shared competence" and "support competence" used by TEU and TFEU are
merely ineffective generic categorizations that always require a specific le-
gal  basis.  Anyway, it  should  be  noted that  the Treaties  opted for  a cast
wider than that outlined by the EU Court.3
It is in the area of shared or concurrent competences in which EU action
is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Therefore,
the EU has to justify that a concrete action is needed at the EU level, that is
more effective and that it is a supranational problem. We must also bear in
mind that US doctrine of implied powers4 has been received, mutatis mutan-
dis,  within  the EU:5 this  may have the necessary competences,  including
new ones, for achieving the objectives set by the Treaty or that are essential
2 In  general:  Hinojosa  Martínez,  L.  M.  2006,  El  reparto  de  competencias  entre  la  Unión
Europea y sus Estados miembros, Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia; Sander, F. 2006, ´Subsidiarity
infringements before the European Court of Justice: futile interference with politics or a sub-
stancial step towards EU federalism?´, The Columbia Journal of European Law, vol. 12, nº 2,
pp. 517-ss; Von Bogdandy, A. and Bäst, J. 2006, ´The vertical order of competences´ in Prin-
ciples of European Constitutional Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford, pp. 335-ss; Mangas Martín,
A. y Liñán Nogueras, D. J. 2011, Instituciones y Derecho de la Unión Europea, Tecnos, Mad-
rid, 2011, pp. 69-ss.
3 To go further: Prechal, S., De Vries, S. and Van Eijken, H. 2011, ´The principle of attributed
powers and the scope of EU law´ in The eclipse of the legality principle in the European
Union, ed. L. Besselink, F. Pennings, S. Prechal, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den
Rijn, NL, pp. 213-247.
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to the exercise of the functions assigned to the organisation. This will over-
come rigidities and achieve the objectives of the Treaty to develop their full
potential in those cases where no competence was provided expressly or
has been inadequately planned.
The exercise of EU competences, not their definition, is chaired by the
principles  of  subsidiarity,  proportionality  and  adequacy  of  resources/
means. Whenever EU acts within its powers if it does by virtue of shared
competence, the intervention must be justified: a) at the failure of MS action
(it is so in PSI re-use), b) for better efficiency of the common action (to allow
PSI re-use will help a better achievement of the EU targets), and c) by the
extent or effects of the action at the EU level. When it comes to talk about
PSI re-use we see that the national action in this field is insufficient and that
impulse from EU institutions is required.
The PSI re-use Directive goes to the principle of subsidiarity to justify its
legal basis, but does so from a number of assumptions which may be called
“classic”:
1) that access is the premise of the re-use and is a basic MS compe-
tence;
2) that re-use is a one-matter, not fragmented from the perspective of
competence;
3) that the overall competence of the EU is limited only to the estab-
lishment of certain basic conditions for the MS and that are they are
the ones who decide to allow re-use of PSI in exercise of their pow-
ers.
Therefore, we understand that:
1) In general,  re-use—closely connected with access—shall  be regu-
lated by each MS and shall not be imposed by the EU (1st general
rule). EU should limit its actions to regulate some basic and elemen-
tary  conditions  of  re-use  that  shall  be  applied  wherever  the  MS
have freely chosen to allow it. Where the Directive rules basic con-
4 “A political power not expressly named in a constitution but that is inferred because it is ne-
cessary to the performance of an enumerated power”. Concept developed by Hamilton and
borrowed by Justice Marshall in McCulloch vs. Maryland 17 US 316 (1819): “The Constitu-
tion  grants  to  Congress  implied  powers  for  implementing  the  Constitution's  express
powers, in order to create a functional national government” and “State action may not im-
pede valid constitutional exercises of power by the Federal  government”. To go further,
Crompton, S. E. 2007, McCulloch v. Maryland: implied powers of the federal government,
Chelsea House, New York, pp. 46-57 (on the Marshall Court).
5 Engström, V. 2009, Understanding powers of international organizations:  a  study of  the
doctrines of attributed powers, implied powers and constitutionalism, with a special focus
on the Human Rights Committee, Abo Akademi University Press, Abo, pp. 53-69 and 128-
159.
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ditions of re-use it will  always comply with EU powers (e.g. free
competition). MS are competent to decide on PSI re-use.
2) In favour of legal certainty, transparency and better functioning of
the  market,  the  Directive  itself  may  force  MS  to  state  which
types/categories of PSI are reusable and which ones are not, so that
legal operators may know what to expect. Each public sector body
should be forced to specify what information is reusable and which
one is not and why; but doing so they are entirely free to decide
about access and reuse. Therefore, the PSI re-use Directive should
establish for MS an obligation to specify if a concrete type of infor-
mation is reusable or not, but in this case they must justify the con-
crete reasons for preventing re-use (2nd general rule). This cannot
be considered an invasion of national competences since the final
decision belong to the national authorities. MS must specify what
PSI is reusable.
3) When an internal legislation, in contravention of the provisions of
point  2,  does  not  expressly  provide whether a particular  type of
public information is reusable or not, the Directive could establish
as a general subsidiary rule (3rd rule) applicable in the absence of
MS specific  regulation:  that in  such cases information is  reusable
provided that such re-use is compatible with Community law and
does not involve harm or injury to the intellectual  property, data
protection or any other right or legitimate/general interest worthy
of protection. MS wishing to avoid this consequence ("re-use implic-
itly permitted") only have to legislate and do it  accurately in the
sense lined out in point 2. In case of silence of the MS re-use should
be considered implicitly permitted.
4) Public information generally available should always be considered
reusable by the MS (4th general rule). MS cannot rule against this
general statement unless it is required by a good/fair cause, propor-
tionate and worthy of protection in accordance with the principles
of EU legal system and/or national one. There should always be a
certain margin to the appreciation of local  peculiarities,  but  with
caution and restraint. All these decisions must be completely moti-
vated by national authorities.
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Of course, MS remain competent to decide if re-use will be allowed
with commercial or non-commercial purposes or the type of license
required, if any.
5) Establishment by the Directive of certain categories particularly rel-
evant, strategic and profitable in which re-use should be allowed in
any case (5th rule). MS would be only free to choose between allow-
ing re-use without conditions, with a general license or standard li-
censes. Re-use here would be considered mandatory. Not to allow
access and parallel re-use of some particularly significant informa-
tion  could  be  understood as  an  obstacle  to  the  market  and free
movement of goods and services, so that the EU would then have
jurisdiction to intervene. However, it could be, perhaps, one of the
boldest steps from a competence standpoint.
This solution implies failure to consider re-use as a whole and fragmenting
it  into  as  many plots  as  types of  information  that  can be  distinguished.
Therefore, re-use would not be considered in itself as a concrete subject re-
lated to a general competence: access and re-use of each type or subtype of
information would become an instrument, an incidental or tangential sub-
ject  related to each of the specific  competencies  of the EU. In fact,  some
cases have already been made or are being taken that way, imposing openly
access and re-use of some public information from EU institutions, in line
with sectorial regulations (e.g. spatial information, environmental informa-
tion). 
Therefore, it would be necessary to think about the categories that would
be included in this course, that in any case support a progressive or devel-
opmental regulation.
3. FORMAL DUTIES NON CONTENT BASED TO BE IMPOSED 
BY THE DIRECTIVE
3.1 THE PRESENT LEGAL SITUATION
There is no broad consistency among MS legal frameworks in incorporating
the text of the Directive, neither in the practices observed. This was some-
what expected, given the content of the PSI re-use Directive and the existing
differences between national laws regarding access to PSI.
Sometimes the right to re-use (with a corresponding obligation for public
authorities to allow it) is set in an accurate, clear and precise form, specify-
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ing possible legal regimes depending on the type of information. In others,
by contrast, generic authorization is anticipated to be the own public sector
bodies who decide whether or not to allow access to information for re-use
purposes and preserve them either for commercial or non-commercial aims
(with the possibility of different legal regimes, given the heterogeneity of in-
formation).
There also tends to be a constant existence of a list of exceptions to re-use
set  out  by  law and therefore  not  subject  to  valuation  by public  bodies.6
These listings are not necessarily restrictive/limitative/precise. In those cases
not included in them it might be possible, depending on the national legis-
lation, either refuse to allow re-use at all, or allow it only for non-commer-
cial purposes.
3.2 LACK OF PRECISE LEGAL NORMS: THE FIRST REAL 
PROBLEM
As there are no standards sufficiently clear and explicit  (with margins of
discretion lower than those found in some domestic systems) to enable pub-
lic authorities to act and specify in what direction, we find that we cannot
advance too much. 
Legislation on PSI re-use is somewhat unsatisfactory, so we could con-
sider that the problem we face is not the lack of institutional support, but
the inadequacy and vagueness of the standard to apply in many cases. In
part, those MS that incorporate internal regulations do it in a not very accu-
rate way because the Directive allows them so. It may be seen a direct con-
sequence of the very low achieving harmonization, but also because the PSI
re-use Directive does not even require the Legislators to be accurate in na-
tional development, leaving aside its specific content.
This is, contrario sensu, the Directive should oblige to regulate the key is-
sues related to the PSI re-use expressly and precisely, but cannot determine
the content of such regulation at the national level, paying special attention
to mechanisms of control and review.
6 Respecting the MS in this  particular  point,  the principle  of  proportionality  must  be  re-
membered in the sense required by the Court Decisions, and for all, Decision of the CJEU,
Second Chamber, December 21st, 2011.
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3.3 FORMAL DUTIES
1°) Explicit regulation: The Directive should oblige MS to act normatively in
a clear and accurate way listing what information is reusable and what is
not, without fixing "the re-usable" itself, except for few exceptions (5th rule
above). 
The lack of clarity or certainty of the law regarding the reusable informa-
tion  can  be  understood as  an obstacle  to  the  market,  free  movement  of
goods and services and the right fulfillment  of other EU aims;  so that it
would then be competent to intervene, even in a subsidiary and proportion-
ate way.
Perhaps one way to reduce undesirable regulatory gaps and the corre-
sponding uncertainty about the status of certain categories of reusable PSI
would be the establishment in the Directive of a general principle according
to which, in absence of clear rules which prevent a certain type of PSI re-
use, the same will be understood reusable. Nevertheless, this principle must
be fully compatible and respectful of the rules on intellectual property, data
protection and other limits for the regulation of PSI re-use in the Directive.
In addition, to address some criticisms of the current situation and solve
problems mentioned,  the Directive could impose on MS the requirement
that a) national regulations point to precisely the organ/body responsible in
each case to resolve requests on PSI re-use and b) establish easier and faster
administrative procedures and proceedings before the Courts.
2°)  Publicity: The Directive should require the publicity of certain con-
tent by various means, suitable and easily accessible, understandable, in or-
der to provide transparency to the market.
It must include in any case the applicable legislation in general; the cate-
gories of PSI reusable and the excluded categories of re-use; re-use condi-
tions in each case; the procedure to be followed, as appropriate, to request /
obtain / proceed to the re-use; legal terms; ways of review and appeal; exis-
tence  of  exclusive  agreements,  their  duration  and reasons  for  the  grant;
charging principles; court decisions, case law and administrative precedents
on the subject ...  There are no competence impediments,  in principle,  for
such publicity duty.
3°)  Regular reporting duty: once again in a double level, national and
European. Information should be sent periodically not only on the applica-
ble regulations and any amendments,  but specially the one related to all
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types of incidents arising (number of requests, response by the authorities,
sectors where requests for re-use are more frequent; existence and condi-
tions of exclusive arrangements, and disciplinary infractions; conditions of
access and format in which provides the information, update formats…).
4. SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF REGULATORS/ 
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES: REINFORCING INSTITUTIONAL 
BACKING 
Re-users, stakeholders and scholars have emerged as a major practical prob-
lem in day to day in this field the silence about the body responsible for de-
ciding about re-use as well as the excessive length and complexity of the ad-
ministrative proceedings and judicial review, all framed in a backdrop of
regulatory uncertainty and reluctance by the authorities.
This has led to propose as a solution the creation of independent regula-
tors/independent agencies.7 However, we must stress that:
A) The first step is to provide accurate legal provisions; then, if they do
not work, specific institutions of this nature could be created. But at
this moment it may be premature to consider the creation of such
agencies.
B) The institutional  backing already existing is  solid enough from a
general  perspective bearing in  mind the standards of an average
democratic State.
4.1 GENERAL PRE-EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL BACKING
MS are legally bound to develop the Directive. The development rules will
be forced fulfilment for the national Public Administrations and different
organisms of the respective public sector. This compliance will be assured
by ordinary and customary mechanisms according to the rule of law.
Given that legal duties are imposed, they shall automatically be met by
public authorities. In the case of infringement, citizens/particulars/ institu-
tions can demand the fulfilment of those legal duties before the Public Ad-
ministration and even before the Courts. We should not forget that in the
context of democratic States, all public authorities must act in full subordi-
7 On independent administrative authorities  (chronologically  ordered): Salvador Martínez,
M. 2002, Las autoridades independientes: un análisis comparado de los Estados Unidos, el
Reino Unido, Alemania, Francia y España, Ariel, Barcelona; Caranta, R., Andenas, M. and
Fairgrieve, D. (eds.) 2004, Independent administrative authorities, British Institute of Inter-
national and Comparative Law, London; Pauner Chulvi, C. y Tomás Mallén, B. (coords.)
2009, Las administraciones independientes, Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia.
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nation to the Constitution and the rest of the Legal System and there are
several ways to control any breach.
4.2 DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES OF SPECIFIC OR ADDED 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKING
The "institutional" options of MS to adopt on this compliance on PSI re-use
vary and go from 1st) creating independent agencies to 2nd) entrusting such
performance to the ordinary administrative structure, passing through the
3rd) special creation of ad hoc bodies incardinated in the ordinary Public Ad-
ministration -and, therefore, without consideration of independent authori-
ties- but with autonomous functioning.
4.3 ARE INDEPENDENT AGENCIES/REGULATORS AN IDEAL 
SOLUTION?
However, on the desirability/necessity of special institutions or independent
authorities  with  responsibility  for  PSI  re-use  similar  to  those  existing  in
some sectors  (data  protection,  telecommunications  competition,  to  name
some prominent examples), there are some questions to be highlighted.
1st) High economical costs and added complexity
There are undeniable cons for the creation of independent agencies, es-
pecially at the present time, most notably the high economic costs and an
undesirable increase of the already high complexity of Public Administra-
tion; an inconvenience accentuated in decentralised States.8 In fact, the cur-
rent trend in a number of MS is the removal or at least the reduction or fu-
sion of these independent authorities.
2nd) Need of a uniform approach in institutional backing
It  is  hard  to  answer  this  question  given  the  present  situation.  There
seems not to be a priority need, at least not for now, to achieve a uniform
approach to control institutions in charge of supporting PSI re-use or to im-
pose a model based on the creation of independent agencies. The priority
should be to ensure a legal framework not only harmonised but also clear
and precise and to guaranty that it is respected.
How MS implement and monitor such a regulatory framework would be
an issue required of specific institutional solutions decided by EU only if se-
8 Salvador Martínez, M. 2005, ´Autoridades independientes y organización territorial´ in El
estado autonómico: integración, solidaridad, diversidad, coord. M. A. García Herrera, J. M.
Vidal Beltrán, vol. 2, COLEX, Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas-INAP, Madrid, pp.
427-450.
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rious breaches of duties throw verifications revealing an inability of regular
institutions  to adequately  control  compliance  based on structural  motifs.
However, until  that situation is an undoubted reality, imposing a harmo-
nized institutional model can be understood as disproportionate and con-
trary to the preference shown by the framework Directives. Anyway, we
must take into account that imposing a uniform institutional model for MS
in the field of PSI re-use may exceed the powers of the EU.
Besides, institutional issues are extremely sensitive because they affect
the organisation of the powers and governments of  the MS, particularly
when they are decentralised. Nevertheless, there are some fields where EU
has  imposed  the  establishment  of  independent  agencies  nationwide  to
them; although it could be questionable from a theoretical point of view if
this can be done or not from a practical standpoint, it is clear that no serious
questions have been raised because there no protests were made in this re-
gard. 
If there are theoretical doubts about the possibility of establishing a de-
gree of harmonisation of institutional  backing and it  does not appear, at
least at present, as a primary need because there are other more pressing
priorities and alternative media, it may not be appropriate to include spe-
cific references in the Directive for now. 
3rd) Other possibilities in institutional backing
In  case  arguments  are  clearly  for  the  creation  of  special  institutional
backing, one alternative might be to create a European Agency9 which may
be even more effective, reach more unifying practices and become a best
guarantor  of  transparency  and  fluidity  of  market  (their  functions,  obvi-
ously, would be somehow different). The competence of the EU to create it
is less controversial from a competence standpoint.10
4  th  ) Independent agencies and separation of powers  
9 On pros and cons of European agencies: Williams, G. D. 2005, ´The EU's independent agen-
cies: institutionalising responsible European governance?´, Political Studies, nº 53 (1), pp.
82-99. Comprehensive analysis of the agency phenomenon in the European Union, taking
stock of the emergence and development of EU agencies and providing insight into the
characteristics as well as the consequences of the on-going EU “agencification” process: Bu-
suioc, M., Groenleer, M. and Trondal, J. 2012, The agency phenomenon in the European
Union: emergence, institutionalisation and everyday decision-making, Manchester Univer-
sity Press, Manchester.
10 Decision of EUCJ, May 2nd 2006, case against UK Parliament. It offers a critical point of
view: Lavrijssen S. and Ottow, A. 2011, ´The legality of independent regulatory authorities´
in The eclipse of the legality principle in the European Union, eds. L. Besselink, F. Pennings,
S. Prechal, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, NL, pp. 73-96.
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Because of the public body that originates the PSI, there are peculiar cir-
cumstances that deserve some comment: PSI from the Judiciary11 and Con-
stitutional  Courts.  In  MS  where  there  is  a  Supreme  Judicial  Council  or
equivalent, with functions that are usually common and with a clear pur-
pose to ensure the independence of the Judiciary, it is hardly conceivable
that their submission to any authority other than judges and courts is possi-
ble from a legal or constitutional perspective. No administrative authority
may monitor or control their actions, including problems related to PSI re-
use. Only courts —and usually a supreme one— can control the action of
SJC since this is a basic requirement of the principle of separation of powers.
Something similar happens with the PSI from the Legislative:12 the ulti-
mate sovereign body could hardly be put under an administrative agency
unless a clear infringement to constitutional principles is made.
5  th  ) Different types of PSI from a material point of view and the problems  
they could raise: institutional consequences
From this point of view not all types of PSI show the same profile13 and it
is conceivable that each of them raises specific problems. While it is quite
possible that in some cases data protection is one of the issues to consider in
particular, in other cases this issue will hardly be relevant (e.g. meteorologi-
cal PSI or related to transportation or roads PSI). 
Where data protection or intellectual property —just to name the most
obvious examples of subject related peculiarities we could find in PSI re-use
— are seriously involved, it might be advisable to allow the intervention of
independent agencies, but not necessarily newly created ones with compe-
tence on PSI re-use. We mean that it could be desirable the intervention of
pre-existing independent authorities competent in those subjects,  such as
data protection, intellectual property or free competition, just to mention a
few.
11 In the Spanish case, problems related with legal sources have also risen. On Acuerdo de 28 de
octubre de 2010, del Pleno del Consejo General del Poder Judicial, por el que se aprueba el Regla-
mento 3/2010, sobre reutilización de sentencias y otras resoluciones judiciales and STS (Pleno Sala
de lo Contencioso-Administrativo) de 28 de octubre de 2011: Ávila, A. M. 2011, ´En torno al regla-
mento de reutilización de sentencias´, Actualidad jurídica Aranzadi, nº 833, p. 10; Blanquer
Criado, D. V. 2012, ´La potestad reglamentaria del Consejo General del Poder Judicial y la
regulación del mercado de reutilización de resoluciones judiciales´, Teoría y Derecho. Rev-
ista de pensamiento jurídico, nº 11, junio, pp. 250-273.
12 Not to mention that in certain cases Parliament designates the members of these independ-
ent agencies: Menéndez Alzamora, M. 2003, ´El Parlamento y las autoridades independi-
entes  de control´,  Corts.  Anuario  de  Derecho  Parlamentario,  nº  14,  pp.  205-222;  García
Costa, F. M. 2009, La función electoral del Parlamento, Atelier Libros Jurídicos, Barcelona.
13 Fernández Salmerón, M. 2006, ´El régimen jurídico de la reutilización comercial de la in-
formación del sector público: sujetos destinatarios y tipos de información´ in La reutiliza-
ción de la información del sector público, coord. A. Cerrillo i Martínez y A. Galán Galán,
Comares, Granada, pp. 25-50.
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But this solution, again, implies new different problems. The central is-
sue is that within the re-use, deep singularities from a legal point of view
can be raised and taking this as a starting point, we find that: 
a) the existence of an independent agency for PSI re-use14 per se does
not guarantee sufficient material specialization to settle all the is-
sues raised quickly and in a satisfying way (not just re-use will be
involved, but also competition law, intellectual property, data pro-
tection, public health and many other subjects); and 
b) the competence of this PSI re-use independent authority may con-
stantly collide with that of other agencies or authorities.15 In addi-
tion,  there  could  be  dangerous  contradictions  on  their  criteria,
thereby generating legal uncertainty. Solutions would have to be of-
fered by law or by tribunals. In some cases, those of collision be-
tween a data protection authority and a PSI re-use agency, the solu-
tion seems rather simple: the first one should have some preferen-
tial vis atractiva because it involves a fundamental right related itself
with privacy. But when PSI re-use and free competition collide, the
solution to be adopted is not so clear without a legal rule setting up
the conflict.
6th) Different alternatives existing in institutional backing, not only inde-
pendent agencies
When it is suggested as explicit content of the Directive redrafting the
obligation to create internally independent agencies, we must insist that it
does not seem a priority and an urgent need, as already explained. Even
more, the redaction of the Directive should be, at this end, more open or al-
ternative, never imposing a single model for all MS since they remain com-
petent to decide about this kind of organisational decisions.
Therefore, three main alternatives for the PSI re-use Directive regarding
this issue must be considered:
a) akeep silent  about this point and not include any mention of the
creation of specific institutions, leaving complete freedom to MS to
proceed as they deem appropriate, based on local peculiarities; 
14 Mainly descriptive: Díaz, V. y Bringas Valdivia, J. M. 2007, ´Autoridades reguladoras inde-
pendientes en materia de acceso a la información´, Derecho Comparado de la Información,
UNAM, nº 9, pp. 81-102.
15 To go further on risks of overlaps between the different authorities as well as on jurisdic-
tional conflicts: Petit, N. 2005, ´The proliferation of national regulatory authorities alongside
competition authorities: a source of jurisdictional confusion?´ in Regulation through agen-
cies in the EU: a new paradigm of European governance, eds. D. Geradin, R. Muñoz, N.
Petit, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 180-210.
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b) impose the same institutional  model for all  MS, through the cre-
ation of an independent authority (this is the meaning of the pro-
posal we have reproduced at the beginning);
c) a middle open way, which does not impose a model at all, but men-
tions and suggests a range of varied possibilities, such as
• entrusting the matter to the ordinary structure of Public Ad-
ministration
• creation of an independent authority 
• involvement of other existing independent authorities, such
as data protection agency (there are many more), consider-
ing PSI re-use as a whole or fragmenting it from a material
point of view 
• mentioning concrete solutions for those most pressing prob-
lems (e.g. arbitration or conciliation systems for conflict res-
olution)
• creation  of  organs  integrated  in  Public  Administration
working with functional autonomy (a solution close to inde-
pendent agencies, but not exactly the same)
All these alternatives for institutional backing have obvious pros: the ad-
vantages in terms of economic costs are clear, in addition to the benefit of
sharing resources and experiences. But it is difficult to offer a best solution
for all MS, since its appropriateness will vary from one to other.
An additional reflection is to be made on the specific case of allocation of
competence for re-use the data protection agencies: nowadays, for many of
them  re-use  as  subject  of  their  competence  is  completely  alien.  Conse-
quently not only there may be a problem of lack of substantive expertise,
but we could also find that when re-use and data protection are opposed in
a particular case, almost certainly privacy will be safeguarded without any
other consideration. As it has been shown by several recent examples in MS,
these agencies trend to prevail privacy against access to public information
and, therefore, this solution may even produce some distorting —or even
counterproductive— effects from the perspective of transparency and re-
use of PSI.
It must be also underlined that many of these independent agencies are
so specialized from a material point of view that they sometimes incur in le-
gal deformations, since they tend to see the legal system from a single per-
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spective,  without  considering  other  rights  or  interests  that  could  collide
with transparency for re-use purposes.
Another possibility to be considered is to attribute various functions re-
lated to PSI re-use not to a single authority, but to several of them, depend-
ing on the problem or legal issue first positioned in each case (data protec-
tion, intellectual property, exclusive agreements that may infringe comple-
tion rules, national security, quality of public services, environment...). That
means that PSI re-use is not understood as a unit, but  torn fragment and
considered accessory to other matters. It seems again a decision that should
be taken at the national level, not from European institutions.
7  th  ) Functions of the independent agencies  
At the origin of the commitment to the creation of independent agencies
there is a confidence that the powers attributed to them would irrefutably
be better performed, thereby solving the problems noted above (especially
that of slow channels or means for resolution of conflicts). Before analyzing
this position, it is appropriate to look back at the hypothetical powers they
could take. 
The answer may differ from one MS to another, but the following are
usually  suggested  as  possible,  among others:  developing  good practices
guide; inspection and monitoring; possibility of imposing sanctions; devel-
opment and regulatory functions, setting legal standards; and above all res-
olutions  of  demands  and conflicts  in  a  quicker  and more "independent"
way.
In any case, set in the Directive a minimum competence, nothing would
prevent the optional expansion of competencies at the national level (expan-
sion of jurisdiction not imposed by the EU, but voluntarily undertaken by
the MS). However, it is critical to understand that these agencies, in almost
all systems we would dare to say, could never have conferred judicial pow-
ers, once again because of the principle of separation of powers.
Attention must be paid as well to two troublesome suggested functions.
First, it is the power to impose sanctions. In many legal systems, there are
theoretical  difficulties  to  sanction  Government  or  Public  Administration.
These independent authorities may punish a natural person or private legal
person or public officials or employees, demonstrated the fraud, malice or
neglect, but not always public bodies. In fact, some national provisions that
have developed the Directive  have incorporated disciplinary  regimes for
the re-users, but not for the Government and PSB.
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Second, it is the resolution of demands and conflicts procedures, desired
to be quick: 
1°) It must be remembered that the existence of special mechanisms for
resolution of demands and conflicts before these agencies in many MS (if
not in all of them) will not prevent subsequent judicial intervention (already
themselves overburdened, should be added). Tribunals´ jurisdiction is uni-
versal and plots of immunity cannot be created.
Nevertheless, it is possible and desirable to introduce conciliation mech-
anisms and administrative procedures for solving disputes in a faster and
cheaper way, but the possibility of further review by the Courts of Justice
cannot excluded in any case. 
2°) One also wonders if many of these functions could not be more effi-
ciently exerted by those public bodies involved in each case, through its reg-
ular organization. For this purpose, special administrative procedures can
be  laid  down  —in  terms  of  re-use—  based  on  the  principle  of  celerity,
agility and short periods: nothing prevents Public Administration to be ob-
jective in applying the law and set up administrative adequate mechanisms.
3°) Special judicial review proceedings could also be introduced based
equally on the principle of celerity. The principle of preference would be
questionable, as it is usually reserved for very specific subjects, such as pro-
tection of fundamental rights.
